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COMPARATIVE COMPETITION LAW AS A
FORM OF EMPIRICISM
Spencer Weber Waller*
This short essay makes a plea for a comparative approach
to the formulation of competition policy as an important type
of empiricism. The United States is no longer alone, or even
unusual, in having a robust form of competition policy. Compe-
tition law has enjoyed unparalleled growth throughout the
world over the past twenty years. Virtually every western
developed nation has created a sophisticated legal system ca-
pable of dealing with restrictive agreements, abuses of market
power, as well as the notification and regulation of mergers
and acquisitions that pose the threat of lessening competition.
Recently, the Deputy Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of
the Antitrust Division informed me that the Section maintains
a file of more than fifty antitrust laws from around the world.'
The articles in this symposium further document the spread of
competition law to parts of the world once deemed impossibly
remote for tourists, let alone competition lawyers.
The United States is out of step with the rest of the
world's competition community in two important ways. At a
time when the rest of the world looks to competition law for its
transformative and normative potential, the United States
remains locked into a narrow vision geared largely to the re-
flexive application of various competing microeconomic theo-
ries. While in many ways United States antitrust has reached
an impasse without any visible solution,' it is the rest of the
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
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This essay is based upon remarks given at the fall 1995 round table held at New
York University in memory of Dr. Betty Bock.
1. A useful but dated survey of the principal competition law systems can be
found in WORLD LAW OF COMPETITION (Julian 0. von Kalinowski ed., 1987). Ob-
taining up-to-date copies of relevant competition statutes, regulations, and guide-
lines is currently an expensive and time consuming effort and requires persistent
contact with embassies, consulates, on-line sources, and law libraries to compile a
reasonably complete collection. An ongoing project of the Antitrust Section of the
American Bar Association will be to compile and update these laws in a single
publication.
2. See Gary Minda, Antitrust at Century's End, 48 SMU L. REV. 1749, 1752-
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world that looks to antitrust for answers to the fundamental
questions about how to control economic power in their society,
the role and limits of markets and economic activity in a de-
mocracy, and the political role and consequences of antitrust
rules.
The countries emerging from decades of central planning
look to antitrust law, and competition policy more broadly, as
part of the overall adoption of a new legal regime to govern
emerging democratic markets and political institutions.3 Other
countries have turned toward antitrust as a form of "light
regulation" in connection with ongoing privatization efforts
within their economies.4 Many lesser developed countries have
embraced antitrust for both substantive and symbolic purposes
as they seek new paths of development and prosperity.5 Ma-
ture market economies periodically consider revising their
competition laws to better reflect national and international
economic realities.6 Most recently, free trading areas, regional
trading blocks, and the World Trade Organization have begun
the long arduous process of reconciling the different notions of
competition inherent in antitrust and international trade law.'
55 (1995).
3. See, e.g., JOHN FINGLETON, ELEANOR Fox, DAAIEN NEVEN & PAUL
SEABRIGHT, COMPETMON POLICY AND TnE TRANSFOIIATION OF CENTRAL EUROPE xi
(1996); Anna Fornalczyk, Competition Policy During Transformation of a Centrally
Planned Economy, 1992 FORDHAA CORP. L. INST. 385, 386 (1993).
4. See, e.g., Maureen Brunt, Australian and New Zealand Competition Law
and Policy, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 131, 178-84 (1993).
5. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Economic Development,
and the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World: The Case of Zimbabwe, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254 (1992) (discussing Zimbabwe's commitment to antitrust
policy, as well as the obstacles it and other developing countries face in instituting
antitrust policies).
6. See Mark Furse, Competition Law Reform Revisited, 17 BUS. L. REV. 247,
247 (1996) (discussing draft bill amending British competition law); see generally
Working Group of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and
Section of International Law and Practice, Report on The Canadian Bureau of
Competition Policy Discussion Paper on Canadian Competition Act Amendments
(Sept. 21, 1995) (tentative draft, on file with author). See also James R. Maxeiner,
Berlin Briefi West Germany Amends its Antitrust Law, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 3, 1990, at
1, 1 (1990).
7. See Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement, chs. J., M. (Nov. 18, 1996)
(adopting competition provisions and enforcement cooperation for free trade area
and abolishing antidumping duties for bilateral trade); Singapore Ministerial Decla-
ration, para. 20, WTO DOC WT/MIN(96)/DEC/W (Dec. 13, 1996), reprinted in 36
I.L.M. 218, 226 (1997) (adopting study program on trade and competition issues);
North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., arts.
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These countries and organizations look with puzzlement at the
United States and its current fascination with antitrust as a
technical exercise for legal and economic specialists and won-
der why we do not seem more faithful to the lessons we have
taught the rest of the world over the last hundred years.
For all the obvious reasons, the rest of the world looks to
the United States as one of the important sources of learning
about competition law. Foreign legislatures considering anti-
trust legislation often turn to the United States enforcement
agencies8 and the American Bar for comments on the best
path to choose.? Foreign enforcement officials read American
cases and the voluminous antitrust literature, attend interna-
tional conferences, and frequently interact with their foreign
counterparts. Attorneys and experts from a variety of coun-
tries, frequently Americans, are often involved in foreign com-
petition proceedings at various levels." Foreign case reports
1501-05, 32 I.L.M. 630, 633-34 (1993) (requiring adoption and enforcement of na-
tional competition laws and enforcement cooperation); Australia-New Zealand Clos-
er Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Mar. 28, 1993, art. 15, 1983 N.Z.T.S.
No. 1, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 945, 963-65 (1983) (abolishing antidumping duties for
bilateral trade and creating transborder system of competition law enforcement).
8. Both the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission routinely
consult with foreign countries about the institution and enforcement of new anti-
trust regimes. In addition, the agencies have stationed career officials abroad to
assist their foreign counterparts on a more intensive long-term basis. See James
Langenfeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and
Eastern Europe Need?, 6 AMI. U.J. INTL L. & POLY 347, 348-49 (1991); James F.
Rill, Creating and Maintaining Competition in a Common Market: The Future of
Antitrust in an Integrated World Economy, 1992 U. CI. LEGAL F. 263, 274-75. For
a debate about the utility of such programs, see A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Wl-
liams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries,
19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 209, 211-12 (1994) (evaluating the effectiveness
of competition advocacy in developing countries) and Craig W. Conrath & Barry T.
Freeman, A Response to 'The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for
Developing Countries', 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 233, 234-35 (1994) (exam-
ining limitations of Rodriguez' and Williams' approach).
9. For example, the Central and Eastern European Law Initiative of the
American Bar Association has organized an extensive network of volunteer attor-
neys to advise on new legislation, including draft antitrust laws, lecture in foreign
countries, and act as longer-term advisers while stationed abroad. I have partici-
pated in several projects regarding proposed competition laws. While each project
has been informative for both the American reviewers and the foreign drafters, too
often many of the comments have consisted of criticism that the proposed law is
insufficiently similar to the more familiar American equivalent.
10. For example, several New Zealand competition matters have featured such
prominent American antitrust academicians as George Hay of Cornell and William
Baxter of Stanford, former head of the Antitrust Division. In a sign of true anti-
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
and agency decisions are filled with citations to United States
cases, guidelines, and scholarly commentary.
The United States is by no means the only model being
examined or adopted. In fact, the United States antitrust laws
have a number of unique characteristics that make it unlikely
that other countries will adopt our system wholesale. We are
among the few countries that have adopted criminal sanctions
as a means of antitrust enforcement. We are the only country
with two separate federal level antitrust enforcement agencies.
Both the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission
differ quite dramatically in structure and function from their
foreign counterparts, each of the U.S. agencies having compar-
atively fewer formal powers of exemption and requirements of
advance notifications outside of the area of mergers and acqui-
sitions. While an increasing number of countries provide for a
private right of action for antitrust violations, ours is the most
robust system of private enforcement combining private treble
damage actions with contingent fee arrangements, class ac-
tions, wide-ranging discovery, civil jury trials, punitive damag-
es, as well as restrictive rules regarding contribution among
defendants and the way settlements are deducted from the
potential liability of the remaining defendants. Finally, the
United States antitrust system appears to be more narrowly
focused on questions of competitive impact and has fewer op-
portunities for explicit considerations of health, safety, and
social welfare arguments that are considered in other systems
to trump injury to competition.11
Any salesman for U.S. style antitrust abroad quickly runs
into a formidable competitor selling a model based on the com-
petition provisions of the European Union (EU). The EU model
is a sophisticated system of competition rules geared first and
foremost toward the completion and expansion of the common
market. Competition for its sake is valued, but as an instru-
ment of market completion and expansion. Direct comparisons
with the United States thus become difficult. Certain horizon-
tal agreements that restrict competition are excused if they
further the fundamental EU goals of market integration.
trust cosmopolitanism, New Zealand has had as a lay member of its High Court
for competition matters Maureen Brunt, a prominent Australian economist.
11. See Spencer Weber Waller, A Comparative Look at Failing Firms and
Failing Industries, 64 ANTITRUsT L.J. 703, 703 (1996).
12. TREATY ESTABLISHING EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
[Vol. XXII:2458
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Certain vertical agreements are strictly prohibited because of
their tendency to reinforce national boundaries that would be
ignored, if not praised, in U.S. antitrust circles. To benefit from
individual exemptions, agreements must be submitted for ad-
vance review by the EU Commission, the sole EU enforcer of
competition law."3 Block exemptions may alleviate the need to
notify and seek approval from the EU Commission, but the
available block exemptions are incomplete, complex, and
geared more to prohibiting certain clauses in contracts rather
than market realities. 4 Penalties include fines up to ten per-
cent of worldwide annual turnover. 5 Criminal penalties are
nonexistent and private damages available only when allowed
under member state law. The courts of the member states have
a complex role enforcing their own national competition law
when not inconsistent with EU law and in enforcing EU com-
petition law through the doctrine of direct effect, while not
treading on the authority of the EU Commission.
Throughout the world, comparative competition law is in
full flourish, not for the purpose of imitating U.S. or EU law,
but to understand and apply whatever may be relevant to the
unique foreign national problem being studied. Through con-
tacts with both the U.S. and EU systems, foreign lawmakers
and competition enforcers have learned to pick and choose
what they need for their own economies, unless the dictates of
regional integration or preferential trade access requires them
to sign up wholesale to one of these two dominant models.
Even then, the foreign model is quickly translated into require-
ments more congenial to the national economy and culture. 6
art. 85(3), 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 G. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-11).
13. Council Regulation 17/62, art. 4, 1962 J.O. 204, 1959-1962 O.J. SPEC. ED.
87, 88 [hereinafter Council Regulation 17/621.
14. Spencer Weber Waller, Understanding and Appreciating EC Competition
Law, 61 ANTITRUsT L.J. 55, 63-65 (1992). The European Union (EU) is currently
contemplating major revisions to its system of block exemptions governing distribu-
tion agreements. See European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in
EU Competition Policy, COM(96)721, Executive Summary paras. 38, 39 (Jan. 1997)
(discussing four options for revising current Commission policy for vertical re-
straints and block exemptions) (visited Aug. 4, 1997) <http'J/europa.eu.intlen/comm/
dg04lententeen/96721en.htm> [hereinafter Green Paper on Vertical Restraints].
15. See Council Regulation 17/62, supra note 13, art. 15.
16. See Spencer Weber Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmoniza-
tion of Law: Lessons from Antitrust, 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 557, 573-74 (1994) (using
efforts to harmonize Japanese and U.S. competition law to illustrate the frustra-
1997] 459
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This ferment of activity abroad rarely seems to be the
subject of serious interest in the United States. An interest in
comparative anything is difficult to discern in federal antitrust
(or any other kind of) lawmaking on Capitol Hill. It is a rare
case indeed in which a United States court cites to foreign
precedent in an antitrust opinion except as part of the back-
ground or procedural history of the case. It would be an equal-
ly rare government guideline or report in the antitrust area
that substantively discusses how the same issues are treated
elsewhere.'7 Foreign cases, guidelines, and enforcement deci-
sions are normally considered only insofar as they are praise-
worthy when they resemble our thinking on the same subject
and blameworthy when they do not or otherwise impinge on
U.S. interests. 8
Fortunately, the attitude of the legislature and the judicia-
ry does not carry over to much of the day-to-day international
work of the antitrust enforcement agencies. Both the Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission have cadres of
truly dedicated and knowledgeable officials who understand
foreign competition law and interact with their foreign counter-
parts in notifications, cooperative investigations, consultations,
negotiations, and participation in multilateral fora on competi-
tion law. However, these sections of the agencies represent
only a small part of large bureaucracies and do not speak for
the vast majority of colleagues in government or in the private
tion produced by the assumption that "competition law in Japan should work in a
similar fashion as in the United States").
17. This criticism is hardly limited to the antitrust field. See generally Ernst
C. Stiefel & James Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United
States-Opportunity for Learning from 'Civilized' European Procedures Instead of
Continued Isolation?, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 147 (1994); James R. Maxeiner,
1992: High Time for American Lawyers to Learn from Europe, or Roscoe Pound's
1906 Address Revisited, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1991); Eric Stein, Uses, Mis-
uses-and Non-Uses of Comparative Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 198, 198 (1977).
18. The two principal times when foreign competition law efforts have received
any substantial attention in the United States were the EC's competition inves-
tigation of IBM which continued after the dismissal of the U.S. government's anti-
trust complaint against the company and the recent EU competition investigation
and imposition of conditions on the approval of the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas
merger despite the foregone conclusion that it would not be challenged in the
United States on antitrust grounds. See Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Deal Flies with
Conditions, EU Approves Merger, 14 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1313 (1997); Edmund
L. Andrews, Minister of Objection Nettles Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1997,
at D1 (profiling EU Commissioner for competition Karl Van Miert and EU inves-
tigation of Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger).
460 [Vol. XXII:2
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bar who vigorously enforce the United States antitrust law on
an everyday basis without a great deal of knowledge or inter-
est in the rest of the world's treatment of similar issues.
The Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competi-
tion, conducted throughout the fall of 1995 by the Federal
Trade Commission, were a welcome respite from the overall
parochialism of United States antitrust. 9 In addition to gath-
ering traditional empirical information about the United States
and global economy, the hearings were a deliberate effort to
consider foreign antitrust treatment of such issues as market
definition, innovation markets, failing firms, and distressed
industries.0 The published report and subsequent initiatives
that emerged from these hearings should be a valuable re-
source for the introduction of comparative thinking in the
antitrust field.2'
Surely, the United States can learn from the success (and
failure) of foreign competition law and practice. Even a cursory
glance abroad reveals a number of innovative provisions wor-
thy of careful study:
" the application of competition law (instead of exemp-
tion) to the actions of state and local governments and
the private firms enjoying special privileges as a re-
sult of subnational legislation (EU and Mexico)
* the provisional approval of mergers subject to subse-
quent review for anticompetitive effects (Canada)
" the replacement of antidumping law with antitrust
principles (New Zealand-Australia, Canada-Chile,
intra-EU)
19. See FTC Hearings on Enforcement Policy Delve into Dynamics of Global
Rivalry, 69 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 487 (1995); FTC Schedules Hear-
ings on State of Competition in Global Marketplace, 69 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) 377 (1995).
20. The testimony of several of the witnesses for these hearings served as the
basis of the essays and articles appearing in Symposium, Perspectives on Efficien-
cies and Failing Firms in Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 571 (1996).
21. See FTC Staff Report: Competition Policy in the New High-Tech, Global
Marketplace, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 791 (1996) (reprinting the Executive Summary and
Principal Conclusions of the hearings). Two offshoots of this project are the revised
efficiencies section to the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in April of
1997 and the FTC's ongoing joint venture project where additional hearings were
conducted in the summer of 1997 to reassess existing policy in this area.
19971
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" transborder enforcement in lieu of mere transborder
cooperation (New Zealand-Australia, intra-EU)
" a more powerful formal role for competition advocacy
in administrative decision making (Mexico)
" greater practical and formal political independence for
antitrust enforcement (Germany)
* antitrust as a constitutional principle (numerous).
The isolation of United States antitrust must end.22 Anti-
trust learning must become a two-way street. If the states are
a laboratory of experimentation for the federal government,
then the rest of the world must become a laboratory of experi-
ence and experiment for federal antitrust formulation and
enforcement. Foreign practice is relevant in helping to draw
the lines of demarcation between competition and traditional
regulation in setting policy for such industries as telecommuni-
cations, energy, and transportation. Antitrust counselors and
litigants must consider foreign experience and create
"Brandeis" briefs drawing on such material when helpful to
persuading an agency or court of the better way to proceed.
Agencies and courts should consider foreign experience in de-
ciding whether practices should be treated as per se unreason-
able or subject to more searching inquiry on a case-by-case
basis under the full rule of reason, or in predicting the likely
effect of challenged practices under the Clayton Act.2 Of
course, foreign precedent and policy is no more binding than
that of a state court or a lower court opinion in litigation be-
fore the United States Supreme Court. But unless and until we
reach a point where the search costs exceed the value of the
22. See Eleanor M. Fox, The End of Antitrust Isolationism, The Vision of One
World, 1992 U. CI. LEGAL F. 221, 221 (arguing that globalization and democrati-
zation have revealed the limits of isolationism and proposing a new model for
competition policy).
23. For example, the EU is engaged in an intensive reexamination of its poli-
cies on vertical agreements which restrict the distribution of products and services.
See Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, supra note 14. At precisely the same
time, the United States Supreme Court is reexamining one aspect of U.S. antitrust
policy toward vertical agreements, namely whether vertical agreements imposing
maximum resale prices should remain per se unlawful. See Kahn v. State Oil, 93
F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 941 (1997). So far, no discus-
sion of EU, or any other foreign, experience on this issue has been offered or is
likely to be considered by the Court, although the EU has actively sought input
from the United States for its reform efforts.
462 [Vol. XXIII:2
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information, the courts should have the benefit of arguments
based on foreign law and the burden of considering the foreign
information and responding to it. Up until now, no court has
ever seriously made the effort in the antitrust field.
A better knowledge, and more frequent use, of comparative
competition law also should affect how we offer our advice to
the rest of the world. We cannot avoid the responsibility of
responding to requests for assistance from nations with new
competition regimes. At the same time, we should avoid reflex-
ively selling the Sherman Act as the answer to the rest of the
world's competition needs.' If we care about antitrust, we
care about the complex forces of history, politics, and econom-
ics that have shaped our law in the United States. That histo-
ry cannot be characterized as a straight-line evolution from a
stone age to an age of total enlightenment, but a convoluted
series of rises and falls of theories, doctrines, institutions,
interest groups, and even accidents that have shaped our
law.' We need the humility to understand that, regardless of
the direction of change in future policy, the U.S. legal commu-
nity of 2030 probably will look at contemporary antitrust with
about the same fondness that a law and economics antitrust
scholar today looks at the United States v. Von's Grocery Co.
26
or United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 21 decisions.
Antitrust, like all law, is not universal, but specific to a
time, place, and culture. If a comparative approach becomes
more commonplace, we will make three giant strides forward.
First, as antitrust elders, we will be more sensitive to the
needs of others who seek our advice, but not necessarily our
solutions. Second, we will be less sensitive and prickly to the
internationalization of substantive antitrust law and the im-
24. See Waller, Neo-Realism, supra note 16, at 603 (concluding that neither
efforts to transfer existing national laws nor efforts to harmonize competition law
internationally are likely to be successful).
25. See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERMLZ, CoMPETilION PoLicY IN AMERICA 1888-
1992 (1996) (identifying six major periods in the history of American antitrust law
and analyzing the rhetorical confrontations between the commitment to individual
liberty and the commitment to equality).
26. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966) (prohibiting
merger between two supermarket chains in Los Angeles with small combined mar-
ket share based on trend toward concentration in industry and demise of indepen-
dent grocery stores).
27. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967) (prohib-
iting all vertical restraints as per se unreasonable after title to goods passes).
1997] 463
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pulse to cast reasoned debate as an "us versus them" exercise.
Finally, at home we have the very real possibility of using a
whole new set of data to wrestle with the familiar antitrust
demons that the United States must consider on an ongoing
basis in deciding the importance of competition and the proper
role of antitrust law in our legal system.
